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Abstract 
The present paper aims to analyse a number of those slogans collected from the sit-in 
quarters in Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Using political discourse analysis, it unravels 
various typical discourse structures and strategies that are used in slogans in the 
construction of a sub-genre of political discourse in the Arab world. Drawing data from 
several mediums, including banners, wall graffiti, audio-visual instruments, chanting, 
speeches and songs, this paper tries to show the extent to which the slogans serve as a 
medium by which political complaints and comments are dispensed and consumed. This 
paper draws on a rhetorical analysis to find out their persuasive effect on shaping the Arab 
intellect and on the change of the political atmosphere in the region. Lastly, this paper 
attempts to show to what extent the slogans meet the standards of political discourse and 
whether they can be considered as a sub-genre of political discourse or not. 
 
Introduction 
The revolutionary tsunami which has broken out in several countries of the Middle East in 
the last few years has brought about a massive number of slogans and has initiated a 
new sub-genre of political discourse in the Arab world. Such slogans have been 
introduced via many mediums, including banners, wall graffiti, audio-visual 
instruments, chanting, speeches and songs. The present paper aims to analyse a number 
of slogans collected from the sit-in quarters in Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Using critical 
discourse analysis (CDA), particularly van Dijk’s (1997) political dis- course analysis 
(PDA), various typical discourse structures and strategies that are used in slogans in the 
construction of a sub-genre of political discourse in the Arab world are unravelled (See 
Appendix for some relevant background internet sources). 
 
In fact, slogans are not something new. The etymology of the word shows that the 
term is derived from the Gaelic slaughghairm which means ‘army cry’ or ‘war cry’ 
(Sharp, 1984). The word was used by the Scottish clan with a view to inspiring the 
members of the clan to fight fiercely for its protection or the extension of its glory (Sharp, 
1984: v). Similarly, slogans have also played a vital role in inspiring people to unite and 
achieve the interests of their countries and to restore their national pride. 
 
In general, although the slogans under investigation are crafted in different countries, 
they do represent the socio-cultural concerns of the Arab Nation at large. This paper 
 2 
 
classifies the slogans under several categories and comes out with a discourse analysis of 
them. It shall assume that the slogans reflect the use of language in the Arab society. At the 
same time, it is noted that the slogans are not attributable to known authors. However, 
they serve as a medium through which a considerable number of socio-political issues that 
are likely to be unmentionable elsewhere are raised. The slogans provide the medium 
through which message composers can state their cases in the knowledge they are on the 
safe side and are shielded from political or social sanctions that are likely to be imposed 
by authorities and the community on members with opposing views. Such sanctions or 
political revenges are very widespread in different Middle Eastern countries. 
 
The present paper aims to find out to what extent the slogans which have reverberated 
in the uprisings of the Middle East serve as a medium by means of which political 
complaints and comments may be transmitted. In turn, the paper aims to find out whether 
those slogans meet the standards of political discourse (van Dijk, 1997) and whether they 
can be considered as a sub-genre of political discourse or not. 
 
Literature review 
Several studies have dealt with political discourse in general. The use of rhetoric 
operations, for instance, has been the focus of a considerable number of studies (e.g. 
Billig, 1991, 1995; Bitzer, 1981; Campbell and Jamieson, 1990; Chilton, 1988; Dolan and 
Dumm, 1993; Hirschman, 1991; Kiewe, 1994; Tetlock, 1993; Windt and Ingold, 1987). 
 
Slogans have also attracted the attention of many scholars. Denton (1980), Sharp (1984) 
and Urdang and Robbins (1984) among others have examined their use in political 
discourse. The use of slogans as a means of displaying dominant ideology has also been 
investigated in a number of studies such as Condit and Lucaites (1993), Denton (1980), 
Kaul (2010) Lu (1999) and Lu (2004). 
 
Studies on the Arab Spring slogans, however, are a rarity in proportion to the great bulk 
of the slogans produced. It can be safely said that the slogans of the Egyptian uprising 
have been given a special attention by a considerable number of scholars. A collection of 
papers on the translation of the discourse used by protesters in Al-Tahrir Square of Egypt 
was published in 2012: Keraitim and Mehrez (2012) have discussed the semiotics of the 
Egyptian revolution; Taba and Combs (2012) have dealt with the transformation 
discourse of the revolution; the translation of the visual output of the Tahrir and the street 
art of the revolution have been examined by Gribbon and Hawns (2012) and Sanders IV 
(2012); and the poetics of the uprising have been examined by Sanders IV and Visona 
(2012). 
 
Another collection of studies on the language of the Arab Spring was published by 
Orient-Institut Studies in 2013. The collection includes papers that deal with the various 
arts of the revolution. Gonzalez-Quijano (2013) has dealt with the use of rap as an art of 
the revolution, Dubois (2013) has discussed the street songs of the Syrian revolution and 
Abaza (2013) has conducted a study on the use of satire, laughter and mourning in 
Cairo’s Graffiti. The volume also includes Srage’s (2013) study, which deals with the 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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phenomenon of the ‘clause equivalent’ of the slogan ‘Irḥal’, meaning go/get out/leave. 
Srage (2013) has argued that this one-word statement formulates a highly significant, 
semantically condensed verbal clause and concluded that young people adopted the 
form and content of this concise imperative in order to affirm their awareness of the 
priorities of political change, i.e. the departure of the regime. 
 
Neggaz (2013) has analysed the linguistic transformations of Syrian Arabic that have been 
taking place since the start of the revolution in March 2011. That study has concluded that 
the Arabic language and its Syrian dialectal forms have witnessed some transformations 
such as new word formations, semantic changes and the creation of new proverbs. 
Although the title of the Neggaz study implies that it is concerned with linguistic 
transformations in general, that study is more concerned with the semantic change 
Syrian Arabic has witnessed because of the revolution. 
 
In a similar vein, Lahlali (2014) has analysed some textual, social, cultural and political 
aspects of the slogans used during the Egyptian revolution of 2011. That analysis has 
shown that the slogans reflect a variety of themes and a diversity of political perspectives. 
It has concluded that the political orientation of Egyptian society has shaped the slogans. 
Furthermore, Lahlali (2014: 12) has pointed out that the language register used ‘echoes 
the diversity of Egyptian society and the different political orientations of its groups, 
including, amongst others, Islamic, secularist and liberal views’. 
 
In addition, Al-Haq and Hussein (2012) have attempted a sociolinguistic analysis of four 
hundred slogans collected from different places in Tunisia and Egypt using the internet, 
TV channels, and newspapers with a view to investigating the language functions that the 
slogans convey. Their analysis has revealed that slogans fulfil twenty linguistic functions 
among which humiliation constituted the prevailing one. 
 
Colla (2012) has also conducted a study on the Arab Spring slogan ‘the people want’, 
pointing out that the slogan has been used excessively to the extent that it loses its 
glamour. Colla (2012) has argued that ambiguity has shadowed this slogan almost from 
the beginning and the slogan has been used as the discursive scaffolding for hanging every 
new demand, even though those demands are sometimes incoherent and contradictory. 
 
It seems that most of the above studies are more concerned with the various art forms 
of the revolution rather than slogans in particular. Even those studies that deal with the 
Arab Spring slogans are more concerned with the topical and ideological aspects of the 
slogans rather than their linguistic features. In other words, they deal with the 
predominant topics involved in the slogans such as hope and aspiration, the call for 
reprimand and prosecution, the call for immediate resignation of presidents as well as the 
call for freedom and liberty. As a result, the above studies seem more related to political 
science rather than to PDA. 
 
The current study is different from the studies available in the literature in a number of 
aspects. Firstly, the scope of study goes beyond the discourse of Egyptian revolution to the 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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discourse used in other Arab countries. Despite the fact that all Arab Spring countries 
have gone through similar sufferings and troubles, some slogans have exhibited clear 
ideological and varietal differences. Secondly, unlike the above-mentioned studies, the 
current study does not only investigate the thematic aspects of the slogans; it rather 
attempts a detailed PDA of them with a view to finding out the strategies adopted by 
protesters to persuade the audience of the validity of their claims and to achieve what 
Chomsky and Herman (1988) called ‘manufacturing consent’. As far as the current 
authors are aware, there are no studies that attempt a CDA or a PDA of the slogans. The 
current study is a PDA of the slogans because it is interested in ‘tying language to 
politically, socially, or culturally contentious issues and in intervening in these issues in 
some way’ (Gee and Handford, 2012: 5). 
 
Theoretical considerations 
Critical discourse analysis is used theoretically and analytically to unravel the ideologies 
and attitudes and power relations behind discourses whether written, oral or both. 
According to Fairclough (1995: 133), CDA is: 
 
discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of 
causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and 
(b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such 
practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power 
and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between 
discourse and society is itself a factor in securing power and hegemony. 
 
Although many studies have been done using CDA, especially in unravelling 
hegemonic discourses, ideologies, and the role and power structure embedded in both oral 
and written texts, there is a dearth of studies using PDA. However, the analytical 
framework for this paper is influenced by PDA as suggested by van Dijk (1997). 
 
van Dijk has extensively published on CDA and he has particularly focused on ‘the role of 
discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance’ (van Dijk, 1993: 283). van 
Dijk (1997) has introduced PDA as an extension of CDA admitting that it is a broad and an 
ambiguous concept that may refer to the analysis of ‘political discourse’ or to a political 
approach to discourse and discourse analysis, as is the case with CDA. PDA, within the 
framework of CDA is mainly concerned with the ‘the reproduction of political power, 
power abuse or domination through political discourse, including the various forms of 
resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance’ (van Dijk, 1997: 
11). 
 
According to van Dijk (1997), political discourse is determined by its actors such as 
politicians (e.g. the presidents, the prime ministers, political institutions, etc.). This 
refers to the kind of discourse generated by politicians in fulfilling their political 
mandates, as in addressing political meetings. 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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Despite his argument that PDA can be narrowed down to the set of activities politicians 
engage in, van Dijk (1997) has pointed out that politicians are not the only participants 
in the domain of politics and thus PDA should also include ‘the various recipients in 
political communicative events, such as the public, the people, citizens, the masses, and 
other groups or categories’ (van Dijk, 1997: 13). 
 
That is to say, political discourse may go beyond the circles of professional politicians 
and political institutions to involve different recipients of the communicative event such 
as the public. 
 
Defining political discourse is, therefore, not a straightforward matter. While some 
analysts restrict it to politicians and core political events, other analysts define it so 
broadly that almost any discourse may be considered political. van Dijk (1997: 15) has 
warned against the extension of the scope of political discourse saying: 
 
However, in order to avoid the extension of politics and political discourse to a domain 
that is so large that it would coincide with the study of public discourse in general we shall 
not treat such forms of discourse-with-possible-political-effects as political discourse. 
That is, corporate, medical or educational discourse, even when public and even when 
affecting the life of (many) citizens, will here not be included as forms of political 
discourse. And although we may readily subscribe to the well-known feminist slogan that 
the personal is political, we shall similarly not take all interpersonal talk (not even of 
gender) as political discourse. 
 
Based on the participants and the content of the slogans, it can be argued that the Arab 
Spring slogans constitute a political discourse. The context of the political discourse of 
the study under investigation involves a myriad of participants. That is to say, political 
parties, the mass people, work unions, educators, students, proletarians, women 
associations, ethnic groups, etc. are involved in various political activities including 
peaceful demonstrating, protesting, civil disobedience and long marches. In terms of 
content, the slogans deal with a range of politically-related issues such as political change, 
dictatorship, oppression, democracy, justice, freedom, equality, accountability, 
reconciliation, toppling the regimes and trialling their officials, etc. However, 
participants and content may not be sufficiently decisive factors to label slogans as a 
political discourse. A consideration of the text and its context is a basic criterion to 
determine whether a text or discourse is a proper political discourse or not. 
 
Hence, to locate the Arab Spring slogans in the realm of political discourse, the focus 
should not only be on the participants or the topics, but rather there is a need to 
investigate other discourse structures. Although van Dijk (1997: 25) has argued that the 
structures of political discourse are seldom exclusive, he has emphasized that ‘typical and 
effective discourse in political contexts may well have preferred structures and strategies 
that are functional in the adequate accomplishment of political actions in political 
contexts’ (van Dijk, 1997: 25). Those various levels and dimensions of discourse structure 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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need to be examined if seeking the typical discourse structures and strategies that have 
‘this status of preferred discursive methods of doing politics’ (van Dijk, 1997: 25). 
 
Since the early 1980s, political discourse has been tackled from different perspectives 
(e.g. descriptive, psychological and critical). However, following a descriptive approach 
or a psychological approach is not sufficient to have a detailed PDA of any political 
event. The approach of discourse structures advocated by van Dijk has been chosen 
because it strikes a balance between linguistic analysis and political analysis. PDA can 
have a lot to offer political science and can contribute to answering genuine political 
questions if it focuses on features of discourse that are relevant to the purpose or 
function of the political process or event whose discursive dimension is being analysed 
(van Dijk, 1997: 38). It is argued here that focusing on the discourse structures of slogans 
is relevant in precisely this sense, as the purpose of the slogans may be to convince the 
audience (i.e. citizens, the Arab nation and the international community) that a certain 
course of action or view is right. The predominant role of language and discourse 
structures in PDA is also echoed by Wilson (2003: 13) who has argued that ‘certain core 
features will, and must, remain constant in the field of political discourse, and central to 
this is the role of language and language structure, and its manipulation for political 
message construction and political effect’. 
 
In terms of discourse structures, van Dijk (1997) has argued that political discourse is often 
organized around particular topics, superstructures or textual ‘schemata’, local semantics, 
lexicon, syntax, rhetorical operations, expression structures and speech acts. The current 
paper seeks to determine to what extent some of these discourse structures are deployed in 
the Arab Spring slogans. 
 
Methodological issues 
Data collection 
The data of the study consists of the transcripts of a number of slogans that were used by 
the demonstrators in some Arab countries, namely, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. The slogans 
appeared on the banners raised by demonstrators or were repeatedly verbally chanted 
during demonstrations. The slogans were widely circulated by various TV channels (e.g. 
Aljazeera, Al-Arabiya and BBC Arabic) and in various media articles, blogs, videos and 
social networks including Facebook and Twitter. The collected slogans deal with various 
socio-political issues in the three Arab countries mentioned above but have implications 
for the entire Arab world in general. They straddle colloquial and standard Arabic and 
serve as a microcosm for the slogans used in other Arab Spring countries. The current 
study totally agrees with Colla (2012) who has argued that the Egyptians like the 
Tunisians before them were aware that ‘they were not only singing to themselves – they 
were self-consciously performing revolution for the entire Arab world’. Thus the selection 
of the slogans is not motivated by political considerations (e.g. failing states vs. non-failing 
ones), simply because all the Arab states that witnessed uprisings are failing in the eyes of 
the protesters. It can be claimed that the Arab Spring slogans are homogeneous and they 
share a lot in common even though their discursive content is sometimes slightly 
localized (i.e. looks more Egyptian, Yemeni or Libyan ). 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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All the slogans were kept intact and they did not undergo any modifications or 
corrections. In this paper, 62 tokens of the slogans collected are used as the database for 
analysis. 
 
Data analysis 
The co-evolution of language and politics is undeniable. Chilton (2004: 16) has aptly 
pointed out that ‘political actors themselves are well aware of the importance of how 
language is used even in the act of denying the fact’. The protesters have therefore 
employed a lengthy list of politico-linguistic devices to resist the power of the regimes in 
their relevant countries. The current analysis attempts to find out the various discourse 
structures used by protesters with a view to representing their ideological square 
‘de/emphasize good/bad things of US/Them’ (van Dijk, 1998). 
 
The slogans will be analysed within the framework of CDA. In particular, van Dijk’s 
(1997) PDA will be used. As suggested by van Dijk (1997) the various typical discourse 
structures and strategies that pertain to political discourse at various levels and 
dimensions will be discussed. The focus is on the slogan’s topics, textual schemata, local 
semantics, lexicon, syntax, rhetoric, expression structures and speech acts. In doing so, 
the current study will be in a position to show how Arab protesters who have been 
powerless for quite some time used the ‘loaded weapon’ (Bolinger, 1980) called language 
to mock, oppose and resist the discourse of the totalitarian regimes that have used 
language to control, marginalize, assimilate and eliminate them for decades. It has to be 
made clear that although this study’s analysis is politico-linguistic, it is more concerned 
with the manipulation of language in the slogans since, in general, this is what 
differentiates PDA from other areas of political research found, say, in political science. 
 
Discussion 
Topics 
van Dijk argues that ‘topica’ or ‘typology’ is not given enough attention in discourse 
analysis. Topica refers to the analysis of diverse discourses, what they mean, the situations 
surrounding them and the contexts in which they occur (van Dijk, 1997: 26). Based on 
their contents, the Arab Spring slogans can be analysed under a number of topics relevant 
to protesters’ religious, socio-economic, cultural and political perspectives. 
 
Political humour and satire. van Dijk (1997: 28) suggests that political topics are mainly 
about political actors. Arab ex-leaders and their actions were a matter of ridicule in a 
number of slogans. A considerable number of humorous and satirical slogans were on 
the lips of Arab protesters. The current study finds that protestors use their knowledge 
of Arab culture and rhetoric to generate satirical messages embedded in political 
humour. In Libya, for instance, some of the slogans read as in (1): 
 
1. Al-shaʿb yūrīd ʿilāj al-zaʿīm. [The people want the treatment of the leader.]Al-
shaʿb yurīd tafsīr al-khiṭāb. [The people want to interpret the speech of Qathafi.] Al-
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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shaʿb yurīd ḥubūb halwasah mārikat Al-Qadhāfi. [The People want Qathafi Brand 
hallucination tablets.] 
 
In each case, the famous Arab-world-wide slogan al-shaʿb yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām ‘The 
people want the fall of the regime’ has been twisted and modified satirically. In the first 
slogan, the addresser wants to say that the Libyan people want to treat their leader as 
insane. This slogan is released as a response to the first speech delivered by Qadhafi in 
the aftermath of the outbreak of the Libyan uprising in Bani Ghazi and Al-Baiḍa’a. In 
that speech, he appeared stressed and bizarre. He incoherently talked about different 
issues and thus the slogan refers to this aspect of the speech. In the same speech, Qadhafi 
accused the opposition of providing the youth with drugs and thus they were fighting him 
because they were in a state of intoxication. Therefore, the revolutionaries satirically 
responded to him saying that they have given up hashish and are really looking for 
Qadhafi-brand drugs. 
 
Expression of political humour and satire is not only through linguistic means alone, but 
also through multimodality, which combines verbal and visual semiotic materials to 
generate political messages. Consider the multimodal political humour in (2): 
 
2. Al-shaʿb yurīd taghyīr al-ṭaʿām. [The people want the change of the food.] 
 
In Egypt, the above slogan appears under a picture of a bowl of butter beans to refer to the 
famous national dish in the Sudan and Egypt. Thus, the message is that protesters, here, 
no longer wish the fall or the change of the regime but rather the change of the food they 
have been eating day and night. The multimodal discourse structures suggest that mere 
change in regime is nothing if the well-being of the people remains a matter of great 
concern. 
 
In the slogans above, al-shaʿb ‘the people’ is the participant; the action of changing the 
regime, the opinion of having Qadhafi drug, or changing the food all have ‘a general, 
official, institutional or public nature’ (van Dijk, 1997: 26). The slogans show a general 
decision taken by the people to control the political process and to oppose and challenge 
its policies, as well as to point at a different and better future for the ordinary citizens. 
 
Political evaluation. van Dijk (1997: 28) posits that topics often feature typical polarized 
appraisals of ‘politicians, public figures, and organizations and their actions’. The 
corpus shows several instances of references to politicians and their actions. Some of the 
evaluations are in the form of swear words directed at presidents, their wives or at their 
political systems as a whole. Consider, for example, slogan (3): 
 
3. Ṣāhib al-ḍarbah al-jawiyah hua kabīr al-balṭajiyah. [The person who led the air 
strike [on Israel and of whom we were proud] is the greatest of thugs.] 
 
In (3), Mubarak of Egypt has been described to be balṭaji ‘a thug’. This word has been 
widely circulated throughout the Arab World. It is a swear and colloquial word that means 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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the person who takes advantage of power and abuses or mistreats others verbally, 
emotionally or physically. Thus, takes advantage of power and abuses or mistreats others 
verbally, emotionally or physically. Thus, 
 
Mubarak, the pilot, who is believed to be the leader of the successful 1973 air strike on 
Israel, is described as the greatest of all thugs. Another example of political insult is given 
in (4): 
 
4. Ya Muʿamar ya abu shafshufah al-shaʿb al-lībi tauwah tashufah. [O Muamar, 
whose hair can never be combed, you will see now how easily the Libyan people can 
topple you.] 
 
Here, abu shafshufah is a relatively new term in Arabic. It has not been in use before the 
Libyan uprising. It refers to the uncombed hair of Qadhafi, which is part of his strange 
personality as they claim. 
 
The slogans above depict what van Dijk describes as the ‘strategic principle of all 
ideological and political discourse…Emphasis/de-emphasis of Our/Their Good/Bad 
Actions’ (van Dijk, 1997: 28). Thus, Qadhafi’s apparently unkempt hair is exaggerated 
to emphasize his strange characteristics. 
 
Political threats. Political discourse is also replete with political threats aimed at real or 
perceived political opponents. Threats of revolt or insurrection against the regime are 
used in the predicates of several slogans and in all the countries that witnessed the 
uprisings. Consider, for example, the following slogans: 
 
5. Lāzim lāzim Ḥusni yaghūr … qāʿidīn huna 9 shuhūr. [Husni must step down. 
[For this cause], we are ready to stay [in squares] for nine months.] 
6. Mush ḥanihda mush ḥaninām ḥata yasquṭ al-niẓām. [We will neither slow down 
[the pace of our protest] nor will we have a wink of sleep till the fall of the regime.] 
 
In these slogans, threats are directed to the Egyptian former president personally and to 
his regime. In (5), Mubarak must disappear and leave power; otherwise, the protesters 
will patiently remain in the freedom squares for months. In (6), however, the whole 
regime is threatened by the protesters who are determined to escalate their activities until 
the fall of the regime. 
 
Nationalism, resentment of current policies and accountability.  
Slogans have also dealt with various aspects of the political domain. The demands of the 
protesters are not confined to their domestic affairs. National issues in general and the 
Palestinian Cause in particular have found their own place in the slogans. Egyptians, 
who are viewed as the pioneers of Arab Nationalism, are not pleased with their 
country’s stance towards the Palestinians, as is clear in (7): 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 10 
 
7. Ḥusni biyh Ḥusni biyh quli muḥāṣir Ghazah liyh. [Hosni, Bey! Hosni, Bey, tell me, 
‘why do you siege Gaza?’] 
 
Here, the demonstrators are trying to find out a justified and convincing answer from 
Mubarak for the blockade they claim he put on Gaza. The slogan exhibits their 
resentment at what they deem a savage policy that aggravates the sufferings of their 
Palestinian brothers. Even worse, their regime prevents the flow of essential needs for 
the Palestinians while it supplies Israel with gas at trivial prices. This issue of selling gas 
to Israel provokes the Egyptians even more and they chanted: 
 
8. Bāʿū al-dawlah wa bāʿū al-ghāz … dūl ʿawizīn al-walʿah bi-jāz. [They sold out 
the state, the sold out the gas. We need to ignite gas and burn them to death.] 
 
That is, the regime needs to be burnt because it wastes the natural resources of the 
country by selling the gas for low prices that are not in harmony with the global prices. 
 
Standard of living.  
Political discourse does not refer only to various elements of the political domain; it 
usually combines its topics with those from other societal domains (van Dijk, 1997: 25). 
A considerable number of people in the Arab Spring countries live under or just above 
the poverty line, which the World Bank sets at $2 a day (The World Bank, 2013). The 
standard of living and the miserable conditions of most of the Arabs are, therefore, 
reflected in the slogans, as is clear in (9): 
 
9. Ya Suzān qulī li-al-biyh kilo al-ʿds bi-ʿasharah jiniyh. [O Suzan! tell the Bey, one 
kg of lentils costs ten Egyptian pounds.] 
 
Here, people who are afflicted with poverty cannot even get their essential needs. Lentils, 
which is the national dish for a high percentage of Egyptians is no longer affordable. A kilo 
of lentils costs ten Egyptian pounds. Another example is given in (10): 
 
10. Hū yalbas ākhar mawḍah wa-ḥna ni-nām al-ʿashrah bi-ʾuḍah. [While [the 
president] wears the latest fashion trends, ten of us sleep in a stuffy room.] 
 
Here, the housing crisis that bothers most of the Egyptians is highlighted in the slogans. 
In (10), while the president is very wealthy and leads a very comfortable life wearing the 
latest fashion, the poor citizens cannot find a proper accommodation. Ten people share a 
single room. 
 
Superstructures or textual ‘schemata’ 
Each discourse genre is characterized by schematic forms that differ according to the 
communicative goal, audience, information load, etc. (Grabe and Kaplan, 1996: 54ff; 
Swales, 1990; van Dijk, 1997: 29). Political slogans like any other genre have their own 
schematic patterning. That is to say, they have particular canonical and conventional 
forms that define their genre membership. Protesters promote their ideas by using brief, 
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clear, eye-catching and musical slogans that easily stick to minds due to their special 
sound pattern. Parallelism, antimetabole, colloquialism, alliteration, assonance and 
antithesis are all devices of the textual schemata of political slogans. A detailed analysis 
of these devices is given in the Rhetorical Operations section. 
 
Another schematic feature resides in the tendency of the composers of slogans to violate 
syntactic, stylistic and rhetorical norms to communicate particular political messages. In 
fact, this is not a disadvantage of slogans; it is rather a merit. As Crystal points out ‘there 
are several situations where it is perfectly in order to be strange, and indeed where the 
breaking of linguistic rules is seen as a positive feature of communication’ (Crystal, 2003: 
400). Thus, by violating certain linguistic and rhetorical norms slogans are able to 
communicate their message efficaciously. Besides, slogans can be multimodal in the sense 
that they convey their communicative goal through both image and text. Some slogans are 
painted onto banners along with pictures of martyrs or/and opponents. Multimodal 
slogans tend to promote the image of the revolutionaries and to distort the image of 
opponents. A Yemeni slogan, for example, contains a photograph of one of the martyrs 
and a distorted photograph of the Yemeni former president in which he appears burnt 
beyond recognition along with his notorious nickname ʿafāsh. The slogan reads al-
shaʿab yurīd muḥakamat al-safāḥ ‘the people want the trail of the shedder of blood’. 
Other slogans are even supplemented with some cartoons as in the following: 
 
 
Source: Sublat ʿ umān (2011) 
 
Here, the slogan ‘the people want to topple the regime’ is represented in the form of a 
cartoon. A hand is shown and two fingers are up, a well-known symbol of victory or 
martyrdom. The slogan al-shaʿab qāla kalimatah ‘the people has said his say’ is 
emphasized in the cartoon by a bold and large font and a rope was hanging around the 
neck of Qathafi. The cartoon has made meanings more ‘prominent for obvious partisan 
reasons’ (van Dijk, 1997: 29). 
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It can be argued that the slogans genre has some schematic features that do not even 
concur with logical reasoning. However, slogans become catchier when they deviate from 
the norms. Besides, slogans can be flexible in their schematic forms. Although brevity is a 
canonical feature of slogans, the Arab Spring brings with it some intertexual slogans that 
cite the opening lines of famous Arab poets such as Abu Al-Qasim Al-Shābi’s 1933 poem, 
‘The will to live’. 
 
In brief, the schematic forms of slogans tend to emphasize some meaning for obvious 
partisan reasons (i.e. to promote their beliefs, ideas, etc.) and thus they foreground 
them. They, however, hide significant information if it is negative to their cause by 
putting it in less prominent textual categories or by deleting it altogether (van Dijk, 1997: 
29). 
 
Local semantics and lexicon 
Those involved in political discourse, according to van Dijk (1997: 30) ‘tend to 
emphasize all meanings that are positive about themselves and their own group 
(nation, party, ideology, etc.) and negative about the Others, while they will hide, 
mitigate, play-down, leave implicit, etc. information that will give them a bad 
impression and their opponents a good impression’. A cursory look at the slogans 
shows that the slogans related to the revolutionaries carry positive meanings. They 
present the anti-regime activists as the Utopian and unified group that aspires to 
change the society for the best. In reality, however, political parties that participated 
in the uprising embrace different ideologies and policies and they never act as a unified 
group. For instance, while the socialists, Islamists, communists, Nasserites and many 
others played a vital role in the uprisings and there is a long history of conflict and 
poor governance among those groups, the slogans do not contain information that may 
bring bad fame to those forces. Despite the fact that some of those factions, as noted 
above have been in power before and they did not rule their countries properly too, 
there is not even a single slogan that refers to their past. 
 
At the lexical level, the choice of the words shows a very clear kind of bias for ‘partisan 
principles of the Ideological Square’ (van Dijk, 1997: 33). While the youth in all the Arab 
countries are thuwār ‘revolutionaries’, the pro-regimes are balātigah ‘thugs’. While the 
youth are musālimīn ‘peaceful’, the others are ʾirhābiyīn ‘terrorists’, qatalah ‘murderers’ 
and safāḥīn ‘manslayers’. In addition, the youth are described in the slogans as al-
shabāb al-ḥilu ‘the good people’ and their opponents as al-shabāb al-waḥish ‘the bad 
people’. On the contrary, the regimes’ alliances have described the ‘peaceful revolution’ of 
the youth as fawḍah ‘chaos’, takhrīb ‘vandalism’ and fitnah ‘sabotage’. Saḥāt al-taghyīr 
‘Change squares’ (where demonstrators rally), are described by opponents as saḥāt al-
taghrīr ‘delusion or misguidance squares’. Even the people who have been killed are 
sometimes called shuhadā ‘martyrs’ and at other times, they do not deserve that rank and 
they are just qatla ‘killed people’. 
 
Moreover, violent actions by both sides have been euphemized. In Yemen, for instance, 
some of the protesters have attacked the official institutions and have called them suquṭ 
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silmi li-al-muʾasāsāt al-rasmiyah ‘a peaceful fall of official institutions’. Thus, the 
attack on public institutions is a peaceful occupation (see: http://www.al-
tagheer.com/news28542.html); the use of ‘peaceful’ in the previous collocation is a 
euphemized expression for a hostile act. Similarly, in all the Arab Spring countries, a 
considerable number of innocent people, protesters and security forces have been 
killed, but such killing of innocents is sometimes called difāʿan ʿan anafs ‘self-defence’ 
or qatl ghayr ʿamd ‘collateral killing’. 
 
Hence, the anti-regimes and pro-regimes demonstrators have used a massive 
repertoire of words/expressions that should be collected and compiled. They have 
managed to ‘create new sets of words to talk about things for which they previously used 
the same words as everybody else’ (Fawcett, 1997: 5). 
 
Syntax and pro-forms 
van Dijk (1997) lists a number of morpho-syntactic features that are related to political 
discourse in English. These include the use of pronouns, variations of word order, the use 
of specific syntactic categories, active and passive constructions, nominalizations, clause 
embedding, sentence complexity and other ways to express underlying meanings in 
sentence structures. The current study’s data show that the syntactic style is subtly 
manipulated in the slogans to project particular ideologies and stances. 
 
Use of pronouns.  
One of the syntactic features in political slogans is the use of deictic pronouns naḥnu vs. 
hum (van Dijk, 1997). Such use of pronouns serves pragmatic and semantic functions 
(van Dijk, 1997). Consider, for instance, the slogan given in (10) above, in which, hū ‘he’ is 
used to refer to Mubarak and wiḥna ‘we’ refers to the Egyptian youth or the Egyptians in 
general. The slogan differentiates between the luxurious life of the president and the 
collective misery of the other Egyptians. 
In other cases, the plural pronoun hum ‘they’ is used to refer to the whole regime, as is 
obvious in (11): 
 
11.  Huma bi yaklū ḥamām wa baṭ… wa kul al-shaʿab jaluh al-ḍaghṭ. [While they [the 
regime] eat pigeons and ducks, all the people get hypertension.] 
 
In some other cases, the cataphoric pronoun naḥnu is used and followed directly with its 
reference as in (12):  
 
12. Ya yaman naḥnu shabābik fatiḥīn li-thawrah bābik lā ḥizbyah wa lā aḥzāb 
thawratana thawrat shabāb [O Yemen! We are your youth We are opening your door 
to the uprising No partisanship! No parties, Our uprising is the uprising of the Youth.] 
 
All the examples above clearly state the sense of solidarity and inclusion when it comes 
to the youth or the people and the sense of exclusion of the regime and its supporters. 
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Use of vocatives. 
Name-calling is widely used by politicians on different occasions. This strategy has been 
widely used in the slogans. The corpus shows a number of instances where the 
revolutionaries or the pro-regime supporters use vocatives followed by a name with a 
view to gaining advantage over, or defending themselves from opponents. The examples 
given below state this strategy: 
 
13. Ya Qadhāfī ya jabān, al-shaʿab Al-lībī lā yuhān. [O Qathafi! O Coward! The Libyan 
people will not be disgraced.] 
14. Ya ʿali ya safāḥ, baqi dahfah wa nirtāḥ. [O Ali! O shedder of blood! There is little 
time left and we will get rid of you.] 
15. Ya Jamāl qūl la-būk … al-shaʿab al-miṣri yikrahūk. [O Jamal, Tell your father, ‘the 
Egyptian people hate you’.] 
 
In the above examples, the technique of name-calling is used by protesters to 
intentionally deride the Libyan, Yemeni and Egyptian former presidents and to construct 
negative impressions or opinions about them. Qadhafi is described as a coward, Saleh is 
viewed as a man indulging in bloodshed and Mubarak is hated and detested by his 
people. On other occasions, name-calling has been used in a sympathetic manner where 
people sympathize with political icons who actively participated in the development of 
their countries. An example of such icons is the late Yemeni president, whom the 
protesters address in (16): 
 
16. Ya Ḥamdi ʿud ʿud … shaʿbak yishḥat ʿa-al-ḥudūd. [Oh Hamdi [the former 
president of Yemen], Come back! Come back! Your people are begging on the borders.] 
 
In (16), the former president of Yemen, the Late Ibrahim Al-Hamdi is called. The slogan 
emotionally addresses him and tells him about the miserable conditions of his people. The 
people who used to have a thriving life during his reign have been turned into beggars. 
 
Imperative sentences. Halliday (1994: 69) points out that there are four basic speech 
roles: giving information; demanding information; giving goods and services; and 
demanding goods and services. The last one refers to what is traditionally called 
Command. Demanding goods and services has been the mainstay of many slogans, as is 
clear in both (17) and (18): 
 
17. Irḥal irḥal ya jabān … ya ʿamīl Al-Amrikān. [Depart! Depart! Coward. You are the 
agent of the Americans.] 
18. Khudh ʿilatak wa itlaʿ bara Libya ḥa-tibqa ḥurah. [Take your family and get out, 
Libya will remain free.] 
 
In the two examples above, the command verbs Irḥal and Khudh have been used to 
address the former Egyptian and Libyan presidents respectively to step down and to leave 
their countries. The use of such verbs reflects the defiant spirit of the protesters as well as 
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their self-confidence of victory. In other words, it reflects their power as revolutionaries 
against the regime. 
 
Halliday (1970) states that one function of imperative clauses is to command others to do 
something, as in (17) and (18); the other function is to invite the audience to do something 
together. The latter is usually indicated by the format ‘Let’s’. An example of this function 
is the slogan given below: 
 
19. Nuḍī nuḍī ya Bani Ghāzī jalakī al-yawm alī titraji. [ Let’s Revolt, Let’s Revolt, Bani 
Ghazi! 
What you wish has come true today.] 
 
Antimetabole. Antimetabole is defined as ‘Figure of emphasis in which the words in one 
phrase or clause are replicated, exactly or closely, in reverse grammatical order in the next 
phrase or clause; an inverted order of repeated words in adjacent phrases or clauses (A–
B, B–A)’ (see: http://www. americanrhetoric.com/figures/antimetabole.htm). An 
example of antimetabole is given in (20): 
 
20. Raʾīs min ajl al-yaman lā yaman min ajl al-raʾīs. [A president for the sake of 
Yemen rather than Yemen for the sake of the president.] 
 
Ellipsis. 
Ellipsis is a cohesive device in which part of a structure is omitted. The use of ellipsis is 
common in the slogans as is obvious in (21) and (22) respectively: 
 
21. Ya Qadhāfī dawrak ja ḍum al-khaymah wa dīr ʿazā. [O Qathafi, your turn has 
come! 
Remove your tent and start a mourning ceremony.] 
22. Thawrah thawrah ḥata al-naṣr … bukra Libya tuḥaṣil Maṣr. [Our uprising will 
continue until we gain victory. Tomorrow Libya will follow Egypt.] 
 
Slogan (21) can be interpreted as ‘Oh, Qathafi, your turn to step down has come’, but the 
part after dawrak ‘turn’ has been elipticized. Similarly, in (22), bukra Libya tuḥaṣil maṣr 
‘tomorrow, Libya will follow Egypt’ contains an elliptical part that can be interpreted as 
‘tomorrow Libya will follow the track of revolution like Egypt.’ 
 
Nominalization.  
Some of the slogans are nominalized in the sense that the verb has been turned into a 
noun. Such verbs are followed by an expanded noun phrase. This kind of structure is called 
iḍāfa or annexion phrase. Consider, for instance, (23) and (24): 
 
23. Isqāṭ al-niẓām al-fardī al-ʾusarī al-istibdādī huwa maṭlabuna. [Toppling the 
authoritarian individual family regime is our demand.] 
24. Maṭlabuna huwa tanḥyat al-raʾīs ʾali ʿbda-allah Ṣaliḥ ʿan al-riʾasah wa kāfat 
aqāribah min al-marākiz al-qiyādiyah fī al-muʾsāsāt al-ʿaskiryah wa al-madaniyah. 
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[Our demand is removing President Ali Abdullah Saleh from presidency and [removing] 
all his relatives from leadership positions in the military and civil institutions.] 
 
Another common nominalization structure found in the slogans is that of a verbless 
nominal clause where a verb is elipticized, as (25) shows: 
25. Libiya f ī alqalb makānik. [Libya! in our hearts you are.] 
 
In the above example, the verb that can be semantically interpreted as is or exists is 
omitted. 
 
Shifting word order. 
Some slogans deviate from the standard word order of Arabic for topicalization purposes. 
In other words, the verbal clause can be nominalized by changing the verb– subject–
object order to the subject–object–verb order. This shift in word order puts emphasis on 
the topic of the slogan. 
 
In addition, the verb is used in the imperfect aspect in order to show the immediacy of the 
action even though the event has already occurred (Watson, 1999: 170). An example of this 
type of structure is the famous and widely-circulated slogan given in (26): 
 
26. Al-shaʿb yurīd taghyīr al-niẓām. [The people want to change the regime.] 
 
In the above example, the normal word order is yurīd al-shaʿb taghyīr al-niẓām, ‘want 
the people the change of the regime’. 
 
Although the people have already made up their mind and taken the initiative to topple 
the regimes, the imperfect aspect has been used. 
 
In fact, al-shaʿb has been topicalized by all parties with a view to foregrounding their 
demands. While al-shaʿb has been thematized in the slogans of the revolutionaries to 
emphasize the demand of toppling the regime, the same word has been thematized by the 
pro-regime allies to emphasize several demands, as is clear in the following slogans: 
 
27. Al-shaʿb yurīd ikhlā al-maydān. [The people want to evacuate the square [of 
protesters]]. 
28. Al-shaʿb yurīd inhā al-ʾiʿtiṣām. [The people want to end sit-ins/protests.] 
29. Al-shaʿb yurīd ḥifẓ al-dimā. [The people want to preserve lives.] 
 
Topicalization has also been used by revolutionaries with an aim to emphasize the bad 
things of outgroups, as is obvious in (30): 
 
30. Al-imām Yaḥya 16 sanah… Al-imām Aḥmid 13 sanah… Al-imām ʿali 33 sanah. 
[Imam Yahia [has ruled for] 16 years… Imam Ahmed [for] 13 years… Imam Ali [for] 
33 years.] 
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In (30), the former president of Yemen has been foregrounded and described as an imam 
because he has ruled for more years than the notorious kings of Yemen, namely Imam 
Yahya and Imam Ahmed. This kind of syntactic topicalization emphasizes the 
president’s lust for power and his tyranny. In line with van Dijk’s (1997: 34) ideological 
square, syntactic topicalization emphasizes the good aspects of the anti-regime 
supporters and the bad ones of the regime and its supporters. 
 
Rhetorical operations 
The main goal of politics is to persuade. Rhetoric, therefore, plays a very vital role in this 
process of persuasion. The Arab Spring slogans are characterized by the employment of 
a ‘smash hits’ selection of rhetorical devices. The use of rhetorical devices makes slogans 
memorable and easy to be chanted and remembered. It is through those devices that the 
slogans reach a broad potential audience. Various Arab Spring slogans were also heavy in 
the extensive use of figures of speech. A few of these are illustrated below. 
 
Alliterations, rhyme and morphological repetition. 
Many slogans have employed deliberate use of phonic patterns for expressive purposes. 
Alliteration, for instance, is widely used. Alliteration is the repetition of the same sound in 
two or more words. This kind of sound repetition creates a musical tone that embellishes 
the language and helps the listeners or addressees enjoy it. Some slogans that use 
alliteration are given below: 
 
31. Bin ʿali bi-yunadīk … funduq Jadah mustanīk. [The son of Ali [the toppled 
Tunisian presi- dent] calls you…. Jeddah’s hotel awaits you.] 
32. Wa yadīna fī yadīn baʿḍīna wa Al-Qadhāfī mā yurhbna. [As long as we join hands, 
Qathafi will never intimidate us.] 
 
Rhyme is also widely used in Arabic political discourse to embellish it and to attract the 
attention of addressees. In the slogans under investigation, rhyme has been used over 
again and again. Some examples are given below: 
 
33. Libya fī al-qalb makānik… Libya namūt ʿala shanik. [Libya! You are in our hearts! 
For your sake we shall die.] 
34. Niḥna lā khawnah wa lā kilāb… niḥna maʿākum ya shabāb. [We are neither 
disloyal [citi- zens] nor dogs, we are supporting you, the Youth.] 
35. Ya ima naʿīsh suʿadā fawqa al-arḍ au shuhadā taḥta al-arḍ. [We shall either live 
happily on earth or martyrs under the earth.] 
 
In addition, different types of morphological repetitions have been noticed in the slogans. 
Arabic abounds in the use of both pattern repetition and root repetition to fulfil stylistic 
and rhetorical purposes or as a means of textual cohesion. In (35), the same pattern 
fuʿalā is used in two words suʿadā ‘happy’ and shuhadā ‘martyrs’ in close proximity. 
Root repetition is also common in the slogans. Yemeni revolutionaries who established 
their camps in a close area to Sana’a University, the top university in the country, 
chanted: 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 18 
 
 
36. Lā dirāsah wa lā tadrīs ḥata yasquṭ al-raʾīs. [We will neither study nor teach till 
the presi- dent steps down.] 
 
Here, both dirāsah ‘study’ and tadrīs ‘teaching’ are derived from the same root darasa ‘to 
learn’. 
 
Simile 
Simile is an aesthetic and rhetorical device that is frequently used in the slogans. In a 
simile, a given entity is compared with another in praise, dispraise, ornamentation, or 
repugnance using particular words/particles like as or like in English and mithl or ka or 
kʾai in Arabic. The corpus shows that there is a tendency to use single similes in 
dispraise of the regimes as is shown in (37): 
 
37. Bism kuli al-fanānīn ḥukmak zift wa zai al-ṭīn. [By the name of all artists your 
reign is dirty and as filthy as a pigsty/rag.] 
 
In Egyptian Arabic, the word ṭ īn is commonly used to refer to something disguisable 
and bad. Therefore, the reign of Mubarak is compared with ṭīn ‘mud’. The colloquial word 
zai ‘like’ is used as a simile particle. Thus, both the likened-to and the likened share one 
feature (i.e. filthiness). 
 
Another example of simile is used by Yemeni protestors, as in (38): 
 
38. Ya ʿali ya safāḥ … lā tabki mithla al-timsāḥ. [O Ali, the shedder of blood … weep 
not like a crocodile.] 
 
The slogan refers to Saleh of Yemen, who was bitterly condemned by opponents for giving 
orders to shoot the innocent demonstrators in Sana’a. More than 50 people were dead and 
dozens of them were injured. As a result, Saleh has formed an investigation committee to 
probe into the matter. The protesters consider this step by him as an attempt to hide the 
heinous crime of killing the peaceful citizens. In their view, the president’s weeping and 
alleged sadness are compared to the tears of the crocodile. Here again, both the likened-to 
and the likened share one feature (i.e. shedding fake tears). 
 
Hyperbole. The slogan composers have used this mode of semantic embellishment to 
make excessive exaggeration about the state of someone or something, as in (39) and 
(40): 
 
39. Ya ʿali irḥal irḥal al-kursi tiḥtak dhaḥal. [O Ali, Step down! Step down! Your throne 
has got rusted.] 
40. Qul li-Muʿamar wa ṣigharah al-shaʿab al-Lībi bukrah fī darah. [Say to Muamar 
and his family, the Libyan people will be in his house tomorrow.] 
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In (39), the protesters have chanted that president Saleh must leave power and they 
claim that his presidential seat got rusted due to the long term he spent in power. In (40), 
the slogan indicates that the Libyan people as a whole will flood Qadafi’s home the 
following day. The use of this figurative device shows that a considerable number of furious 
Libyan protestors will reach his palace and will be able to topple him. 
 
Metonymy. Metonymy is frequently used in political discourse in Arabic. It is a figure of 
speech in which a thing or concept is replaced with the name of something intimately 
connected to it. Metonymy differs from metaphor. While metaphor’s association is by 
similarity between two concepts, that of metonymy is by contiguity (Courtney, 1990: 75). 
An example of the use of metonymy is given in (41): 
 
41. Ya ʿali ʿataf farshak… min taʿiz yasquṭ ʿarshak. [O, Ali! Fold your bed… Your 
throne will certainly fall by the Taizi revolutionaries.] 
 
In the above instance, ʿarshak ‘your throne’ that is associated with royalty and power has 
been used as metonym for it. A kind of metonymy is synecdoche (i.e. a part of speech in 
which a specific part of something is used to refer to the whole). This figure of speech has 
also been frequently used in the slogans, as is obvious in the example above, wherein the 
phrase ʿataf farshak ‘pack and fold your mattress’ has been used to refer to the whole 
process of leaving power. Saleh is not required to pack his bed but to step down. Another 
example is shown in (42): 
 
42. Ya mubārak ya khasīs dam Al-Miṣri mush rakhīṣ. [O Mubarak, the wicked! the 
blood of the Egyptian is never cheap.] 
 
The expression dam Al-Miṣri has been used as synecdoche, in the sense that it is not only 
the blood of the Egyptians that is not cheap but the Egyptians as a whole are not cheap. 
 
According to Abdul-Roaf (2006: 234) ‘the major function of metonymy is to allude to a 
characteristic feature of someone and cover it up with a given linguistic expression 
instead of explicitly mentioning it. This pragmatic function is employed by the 
communicator in both praise and dispraise’. In both (43) and (44), metonymy of 
attribute is used to refer to the characteristic traits of both Saleh and Qadhafi 
respectively: 
 
43. Allah yumhil wa lā yuhmil ya ʿali ya ʿaf āsh. [O, Afash! God’s mill grinds slow but 
sure.] 
44. Ya Muʿamar ya bu shafshufah… [Oh Qaddafi abu shafsufah! [a man of shaggy 
hair].] 
 
Saleh is described as ʿaf āsh ‘a floating useless thing’ and Qadhafi is disparagingly 
called abū shafshufah, or a man with messy and shaggy hair. 
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Antithesis. Antithesis is a semantic embellishment, which means the combination of two 
opposite things whether they are allegorical or non-allegorical. This device is also used in 
the slogans. Consider, for instance, the following example used by the Libyan protestors: 
 
45. Lā ʾilāh ʾila Allah Al-Qadhāfi ʿadu Allah… Lā ʾilāh ʾila Allah al-shahīd ḥabīb Allah. 
[There is no God but Allah, Qathafi is the enemy of God… There is no God but Allah, the 
martyr is the beloved of God.] 
 
Here, the antithesis is represented by the occurrence of two contradictory statements: 
the first is that Qadhafi is the enemy of God and the second is that the martyr is the 
beloved of Him. 
 
Parallelism. The persuasiveness of the slogans is sometimes heightened through the use 
of parallel structures, as (46) shows: 
 
46. Thawrah f ī tunis thawra fī maṣr thawra fī libiya ḥata al-naṣr. [An uprising in 
Tunisia… An uprising in Egypt and an uprising in Libya until we gain victory.] 
 
Here, three successive clauses within the sentence have employed the same syntactic 
structure. Another example is illustrated in (47): 
 
47. Ya shabāb ma tikhafush … Qathāfi ma nibush Ya banāt lā tabkūsh … al-shuhadā 
mā yamutūsh. [Oh Youth! Never get scared, we do not want Qathafi anymore. Oh girls, 
never weep, Martyrs never die.] 
 
Here, the parallel syntactic structure (vocative + noun+ negation particle + present verb, 
noun + negative particle + present verb) is used in the two sentences of the slogan. 
 
Repetition. The rhetorical strategy of repetition is employed in the slogans for a number 
of reasons including, emphasis, emotional effect, amplification, etc. An example of 
rhetorical repetition is given in (48): 
 
48. ʿahdak wala wala wa raḥ… lā ṭawārʾ ya safāḥ Thawra thawra silmiyah … min 
saḥāt al-ḥuriyah Ya ʿali zūl zūl… ḥukmak ma ʿād lu maf ʿ ūl. 
[Your rule has gone has gone … [There is] no emergency, Blood shedder! An uprising, a 
peaceful uprising has started in the squares of freedom. 
Oh Ali depart, depart, your regime no longer exists.] 
 
Expression structures 
Another element valued in a political discourse is that of expression structures. There is 
no exaggeration if it is claimed that the protesters left no stone unturned to present their 
slogans. The way the expression structures of sounds and graphics are shown plays ‘an 
indirect function in emphasizing or de-emphasizing partisan meanings’ (van Dijk, 1999: 
36). 
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While some of the slogans were written to be chanted, they were presented in a skillful graphic 
manner. Bold fonts and eye-catching colours have been used. The demonstrators have 
employed and initiated various means through which they express their slogans. The 
ideational meaning has been expressed through banners, craving in bread, tattoo, graffitists, 
photographs and drawings. Some slogans have even been written with blood. Thus, different 
semiotic systems have been used and they worked together semantically (Halliday and Hasan, 
1985: 4). This makes slogans a representative genre of social semiotics where meanings are 
projected via a range of modes, such as language, images, comics, televisions and the like. It 
has been customary to notice protesters carrying banners with images and texts as has been 
mentioned earlier. Some slogans have been written, sung and represented visually. 
 
Speech acts and interaction 
A speech act can be defined as the action performed by a speaker with an utterance. A 
pragmatic analysis of the Arab Spring slogans indicates that the slogans’ composers employ 
several speech illocutionary forces. Many slogans are directives in the form of commands 
and orders as noticed in (49): 
 
49. Irhal yaʿni imshi … wila mā tifhamshi. [Depart means leave… Do not you 
understand?] Encouragement is also a very common speech act in the slogans, as is 
clear in (50): 
50. Zīd taḥadi zīd ya ṣaqrī al-waḥīd. [Go on in your challenge [to the protesters], 
Go on, mighty falcon!] 
 
Here, Qadhafi is encouraged by his supporters to be more stubborn and to take the 
challenge. Some slogans have featured advice and warning as in (51), where the youth are 
advised to continue their uprising until change is attained. At the same time, the slogan 
warns them not to launch a long-term uprising because the continuous revolution is 
destructive chaos: 
 
51. Thawra ḥata al-naṣr wa al-taghyīr wa laysat thawra īla al-ʾabad fa-al-thawra al-
mustimarah fauḍah mudamirah. [The uprising should continue until it wins victory and 
change is fulfilled. It should not be longer because the continuous uprising means 
continuous chaos.] 
 
Threat as a speech act is also very prevalent in the slogans, as is stated in (52): 
 
52. ʾah ya ḥukumat hishik bishik… bukrah al-shaʿb Al-Miṣri yakushik. [Oh, 
incompetent/ unworthy government, tomorrow the Egyptian people will throw you out.] 
 
Here, Mubarak’s incompetent government is threatened to be swept away. In addition, 
some slogans serve an assertive function as in (53): 
 
53. Mush ḥanihda mush ḥaninām ḥata yasquṭ alniẓām. [We will neither slow down 
[the pace of our protest] nor will we have a wink of sleep till the fall of the regime.] 
of our protest] nor will we have a wink of sleep till the fall of the regime.] 
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In (53), the protesters assert that they will not calm down till the fall of the regime. 
Other speech acts frequently used in the slogans are accusation and counter-accusation. In 
(54), for example, the pro-Qadhafi demonstrators accuse the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera 
channel of being notoriously ignoble: 
 
54. Ya jazīrah ya ḥaqīrah al-qāʾid mā nibu ghairah. [O Jazeera, how ignoble are 
you! We accept none but our leader.] 
 
On the other hand, the anti-regime protesters have apologized to it for the false 
accusations of Qadhafi supporters, as is clear in (55): 
 
55. Wa Allah manik ḥaqīrah naʿtadhir lik ya Al-Jazīrah. [We swear by God you are a 
channel of vaunted reputation. We apologize to you, Jazeera.] 
 
Denial of accusations raised by opponents is also reflected in a number of other slogans, as 
is obvious in (34) above and (56): 
 
56. Khazaytana ya ʿali … ayn Amrīka ayn ṭali. [You brought us a bad name, Ali… 
Neither America nor others is behind our uprising.] 
 
In (34), the anti-regime Libyans deny being treacherous and in (57), the anti-regime 
Yemenis deny the former president’s accusation that they are backed by America. 
 
Another political act common in the slogans is that of legitimation. Disclaimer has 
sometimes been used as a discursive strategy. Several slogans present something 
positive at first, and then reject it by employing a particular term such as lakin (van Dijk, 
1995, 1998). This serves as a positive representation of self-legitimation and negative 
representation of other-de-legitimation (van Dijk, 1995, 1998, 2006). Consider, for 
example, the slogan given in (57): 
 
57. Taʿiz musalimah wa lakinaha sa-tantaf iḍ wa tashtaʿil radan ʿala maḥraqatikum. 
[Taʿiz is a city of peace. However, it will revolt in response to your holocaust.] 
 
The slogan shows that the Yemeni province of Taʿiz is peaceful in nature and in practice, 
but its people will carry the arm to defend themselves as a reaction to attacking the freedom 
square in Taʿiz. Such an incident has been called al-maḥraqah ‘the Holocaust’ as a 
reminder of the Holocaust of the Jews at the hands of the Nazi leader, Hitler. The slogan 
clearly legitimates the use of the arm in the face of the security forces. Similarly, religion 
has been used as a discourse strategy of legitimizing self-defence and war. The Qurāʾnic 
verse ‘kutba ʿlikum al-qitāl wa hwa kurh lakum’ ‘Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye 
dislike it’ has been used by protesters in many Arab Spring countries. 
 
As van Dijk (1997: 37) points out legitimization is not ‘a speech act in the strict sense, 
but a complex social act or process that may be accomplished by other speech acts, such 
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as assertions, denials, counter-accusations, and so on’. Consider, for example (58), in 
which Saleh’s supporters chant for him to continue in power in compliance with the 
constitutional and election legitimation. The supporters have counter-argued Saleh’s 
opponents who call for the fall of Saleh’s regime. For instance, several speech acts are in 
play in (58), such as assertion and the denial of the opponents’ claim that Saleh is no 
longer the legitimate president of the Republic: 
 
58. Al-shʿab yurīd ʿali ʿabdallah Ṣāliḥ wa yujasid baqāʾah iḥtirām al-sharʿiyah al-
dustūriyah wa  al-intikhābiyah  alti  istmadha  min  fawzih  fī  intikhābāt  tanafusiyah  
li-al-riyasah wa  al-intikhābiyah  alti  istmadha  min  fawzih  fī  intikhābāt  
tanafusiyah  li-al-riyasah al-yamanyah. [The people want Ali Abdullah Saleh. [His 
presence embodies respect for the constitutional and election legitimacy he drew from his 
victory in competitive elections for the presidency of Yemen.] 
 
As opposed to al-sharʿiyah al-dustūriyah ‘constitutional legitimation’ of the regime, the 
revolu- tionaries have also legitimated their uprising calling it, al-sharʿiyah al-
thawriyah ‘revolutionary legitimation’. 
 
Some slogans have also taken the form of questions. The toppled presidents have been 
questioned on more than one occasion. Mubarak, for example, has been asked by the 
protesters to clarify how he possessed 70 billion dollars in (59): 
 
59. Ya Mubārak ya ṭayār minlak 70 milyār. [O Mubarak! The pilot, how can you 
accumulate a wealth of 70 billion dollar?] 
 
The question here is not a question in the strict sense (i.e. it does not need any answer 
from the respondent). It rather intends to show how corrupt Mubarak is. 
 
Another illocutionary act in the slogans is that of appeal to God. Both pro- and anti-
regime in Yemen, for example, appeal and pray to God to help them. While the protesters 
supplicate to God to assist them to get rid of the president, as is obvious in (60), Saleh’s 
supporters pray to God to grant him victory and success as in (61): 
 
60. Ya Allah ya allah yasquṭ ʿali ʿabdallah. [We pray to you God! We pray to you 
God! Ali Abdullah will fall.] 
61. Ya Allah ya Allah inṣur ʿali ʿabdallah. [We pray to you God! We pray to you God! 
Grant Ali Abdullah your victory.] 
 
It is obvious then that Arab Spring slogans exhibit universal features. Although the 
current study is not concerned with finding out the specificity of the Arab slogans and 
their differences from the slogans used worldwide, it would be useful to show some of 
those differences. In terms of linguistic features, Arab Spring slogans, like slogans used 
elsewhere, are mapped onto the various levels of linguistics from lexis to pragmatics to 
enable the demonstrators to coerce, represent and misrepresent, legitimize and 
delegitimize (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997: 211– 215). In terms of the 
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macropropositions or topics of the slogans, the Arab Spring slogans show some 
difference. Arabs are really preoccupied with the concept of leadership and thus the 
slogans tend to be more revolutionary. This is somewhat different from slogans 
produced in other regions, which are for the most part reformist. In addition, the topics 
of slogans in other regions are likely to be semantically modalized (Lycan, 1994; van 
Dijk, 1997) in the sense that events and actions may be permitted or obligatory, 
wished or regretted, and so on (Coates, 1990; Maynard, 1993). Most of the Arab 
slogans, however, encompass actions that must be fulfilled. In other words, Arab 
Spring slogans are less semantically modalized for permission, wish or regret. Most of 
the slogans show the obligatory actions of toppling the regimes, trailing them and 
humiliating them. 
 
Therefore, it can be claimed that the format of the Arab Spring slogans and slogans in 
other regions have become rather homogeneous even though their discursive content is 
increasingly localized. Slogans are widely used in the entire world and their spread can be 
parallel to McDonaldization (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2004: 99). That is to say, 
while the formats of McDonald’s burgers are the same in the whole world, local versions 
of McDonald’s burgers are sold in different regions in the world. 
 
Conclusion 
The Arab Spring slogans have become an evolving sub-genre of political discourse. The 
slogans collected from different parts of the Arab world have shown that the slogans meet 
the various typical discourse structures and strategies that pertain to political discourse 
at various levels and dimensions. The slogans’ topics, textual schemata, local semantics, 
lexicon, syntax and pro-forms, rhetorical operations and expression structures justify 
that they are an essential element of the overall political discourse (van Dijk, 1997). The 
slogans deal with political as well as social topics. They have their own unique schematic 
structures and superstructures. The local semantics of the slogans tend to better the 
image of the in-groups and distort the image of out-groups. A lengthy list of words has 
come into existence during the uprisings. The syntax of the slogan is characterized by 
brevity, the avoidance of complex sentences, nominalization, special use of pronouns (i.e. 
positive use of the pronoun ‘we’ and negative association with the pronoun ‘they’), and 
unique use of foregrounding and backgrounding with a view to emphasizing or 
deemphasizing something. Besides, the slogans employ a ‘smash hits’ selection of 
rhetorical devices. The slogans are full of similes, metaphors, metonymies, antithesis, etc. 
Prosodic features decorate almost all the slogans. Cohesive devices such as parallelism, 
ellipsis and morphological repetition are craftily and skilfully used. As for expression 
structure, slogans appear in different forms and shapes. Some of the slogans are 
multimodal where text, image and music go hand in hand. Finally, slogans serve multiple 
speech acts. Directives, questions, appeal and pray, accusation and counter-accusations, 
legitimation, etc. are found in the slogans. 
 
 
 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 25 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions 
to improve the quality of the paper. 
 
Funding 
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 26 
 
References 
Abaza M (2013) Satire, laughter and mourning in Cairo’s graffiti. Orient-Institut Studies 
2(2013). Available at: http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/orient-
institut-studies/2–2013/abaza_satire/ (accessed 8 June 2015). 
Abdul-Raof H (2006) Arabic Rhetoric: A Pragmatic Analysis. London, UK: Routledge. 
Al-Haq FA and Hussein A (2012) The slogans of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. In: 
42nd Colloquium on African Languages and Linguistics (CALL), Leiden, The 
Netherlands, 27–29 August 2012. Leiden, The Netherlands: Leiden University 
Centre for Linguistics. 
Billig M (1991) Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology. London, UK: 
SAGE. Billig M (1995) Banal Nationalism. London, UK: SAGE. 
Bitzer L (1981) Political rhetoric. In: Nimmo DD and Sanders KR (eds) Handbook of 
Political Communication. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, pp.225–248. 
Bolinger D (1980) Language - the Loaded Weapon: The Use and Abuse of Language 
Today. London, UK: Longman Group. 
Campbell KK and Jamieson KH (1990) Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric 
and the Genres of Governance. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Chilton P (1988) Orwellian Language and the Media. London, UK: Pluto Press. 
Chilton P (2004) Analyzing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London, UK: 
Routledge. 
Chilton PA and Schäffner C (1997) Discourse and politics. In: van Dijk TA (ed.) 
Discourse as Social Interaction. London, UK: SAGE, pp.206–230. 
Chomsky N and Herman E (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the 
Mass Media. New York, NY: Pantheon. 
Coates J (1990) Modal meaning: The semantic–pragmatic interface. Journal of 
Semantics 7(1): 53–63. Colla   E   (2012)   The   people   want.   MER   42(263).   
Available   at:   www.midanmasr.com/en/article.aspx?ArticleID=220 (accessed 8 
June 2015).  
Condit C and Lucaites J (1993) Crafting Equality: America’s Anglo-African Word. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Courtney R (1990) Drama and Intelligence: A Cognitive Theory. Montreal, QC: McGill-
Queen’s University Press. 
Crystal D (2003) The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Denton R (1980) The rhetorical functions of slogans: Classifications and 
characteristics. Communication Quarterly 28(2): 10–18. 
Dolan FM and Dumm TL (eds) (1993) Rhetorical Republic: Governing Representations in 
American Politics. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. 
Dubois S (2013) Streets songs from the Syrian protests. Orient-Institut Studies 2(2013). 
Available at: http:// www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/orient-institut-
studies/2–2013/dubois_songs   (accessed   8 June 2015). 
Fairclough NL (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. 
Harlow, UK: Longman. Fawcett P (1997) Translation and Language: Linguistic 
Theories Explained. Manchester, UK: St Jerome Publishing. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 27 
 
Gee JP and Handford M (2012) Introduction. In: Gee JP and Handford M (eds) The 
Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis. New York, NY: Routledge, pp.1–6. 
Gonzalez-Quijano Y (2013) Rap, an art of the revolution or a revolution in art? Orient-
Institut Studies 2 (2013). Available at: 
http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/orient-institut-studies/2–
2013/ gonzalez-quijano_rap (accessed 8 June 2015). 
Grabe W and Kaplan RB (1996) Theory and Practice of Writing: An Applied Linguistic 
Perspective. New York, NY: Longman. 
Gribbon L and Hawns S (2012) Signs and signifiers: Visual translations of revolt. In: 
Mehrez S (ed.) Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir. 
Cairo, Egypt and New York, NY: The American University in Cairo Press, 
pp.103–142. 
Halliday MAK (1970) Language structure and language function. In: Lyons J (ed.) 
New Horizons in Linguistics. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, pp.140–165. 
Halliday MAK (1994) An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London, UK: Edward 
Arnold. 
Halliday MAK and Hasan R (1985) Language, Context, and Text: Aspects of Language in 
a Social-semiotic Perspective. Geelong, Victoria: Deakin University Press 
[Republished by Oxford University Press 1989]. Hirschman AO (1991) The Rhetoric 
of Reaction: Perversity, Futility and Jeopardy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Kaul DK (2010) Continuing Place Discourse – Place Identity and Slogans. Available at: 
http://panunkashmir.org/blog/ecoculture/continuing-place-discourse-place-
identity-and-slogans (accessed 5 August 2013). 
Keraitim S and Mehrez S (2012) Mulid al-Tahrir: Semiotics of a revolution. In: Mehrez S 
(ed.) Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir. Cairo, Egypt and 
New York, NY: The American University in Cairo Press, pp.25–68. 
Kiewe A (1994) The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric. New York, NY: Praeger. 
Lahlali M (2014) The discourse of Egyptian slogans: From ‘Long Live Sir’ to ‘Down with 
the Dictator’. Journal of Arab Media and Society 19: 1–14. 
Lu X (1999) An ideological/cultural analysis of political slogans in Communist China. 
Discourse and Society 10(4): 487–508. 
Lu X (2004) Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese 
Thought, Culture, and Communication. Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press. 
Lycan WG (1994) Modality and Meaning. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Machin D and Van Leeuwen T (2004) Global media: Generic homogeneity and discursive 
diversity. Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 18(1): 99–120. 
Maynard SK (1993) Discourse Modality: Subjectivity, Emotion, and Voice in the 
Japanese Language. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Benjamins. 
Neggaz N (2013) Syria’s Arab spring: Language enrichment in the Midst of revolution. 
Language Discourse and Society, 11. Available at: http://www.language-and-
society.org/journal/2–2/1_neggaz_article.pdf (accessed 9 July 2015). 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 28 
 
Sanders L IV (2012) Reclaiming the city: Street art of the revolution. In: Mehrez S (ed.) 
Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir. Cairo, Egypt and New 
York, NY: The American University in Cairo Press, pp.143–182. 
Sanders L IV and Visona M (2012) The soul of Tahrir: Poetics of a revolution. In: Mehrez S 
(ed.) Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir. Cairo, Egypt and 
New York, NY: The American University in Cairo Press, pp.213–248. 
Sharp H (1984) Advertising Slogans of America. Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press. 
Srage N (2013) The Protest discourse: The example of “Irhal” (Go/Get Out/Leave). 
Orient-Institut Studies 2 (2013). Available at: 
http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/orient-institut-studies/2–
2013/ srage_protest (accessed 8 June 2015). 
Swales J (1990) Genre Analysis: English in Academic and Research Settings. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Taba A and Combs C (2012) Of drama and performance: Transformative discourse of 
the revolution. In: Mehrez S (ed.) Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language 
of Tahrir. Cairo, Egypt and New York, NY: The American University in Cairo 
Press, pp.69–102. 
Tetlock PE (1993) Cognitive structural analysis of political rhetoric: Methodological and 
theoretical issues. In: Iyengar S and McGuire WJ (eds) Explorations in Political 
Psychology: Dulce Studies in Political Psychology. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, pp.380–405. 
Urdang L and Robbins C (eds) (1984) Slogans. Detroit, MI: Gale Research Company. 
van Dijk TA (1993) Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse and Society 4(2): 
249–283. 
van Dijk TA (1995) Discourse analysis as ideology analysis. In: Schäffner C and Wenden A 
(eds) Language and Peace. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, pp.17–33. 
Available at: http://www.discourse.org (accessed 13 October 2011). 
van Dijk TA (1997) What is political discourse analysis? In: Blommaert J and Bulcaen C 
(eds) Political Linguistics 11(1). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Benjamins, pp.11–
52. 
van Dijk TA (1998) Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage 
van Dijk TA (1999) Critical discourse analysis and conversation analysis. Discourse and 
Society 10(4): 459– 450. 
van Dijk TA (2006) Politics, Ideology and Discourse. Available at: 
http://www.discourse.org (accessed 17 March 2011). 
Watson J (1999) The syntax of headlines and news summaries in Arabic. In: Suleiman 
Y (ed.) Arabic Grammar and Linguistics. London, UK: London University Press, 
pp.161–181. 
Wilson J (2003) Political discourse. In: Schiffrin D, Tannen D and Hamilton HE (eds) 
The Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Blackwell Reference Online. Available at: 
http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9780631205968_ch
unk_g978063120596821> (accessed 9 July 2015). 
Windt T and Ingold B (1987) Essays in Presidential Rhetoric. Dubuque, IA: Kendall 
Hunt. 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 29 
 
Author biographies 
Belqes Al-Sowaidi received her BA in English Language and Literature from Taiz 
University, Taiz, Yemen in 2000. She was awarded her MA in Translation from the same 
University in 2006. She obtained her PhD in Linguistics from the Department of 
Linguistics, Language and Communication Studies at the University of the Western Cape 
in 2011. She is currently a research fellow of the University of the Western Cape and an 
assistant professor at Taiz University,Yemen. 
 
Felix Banda is a professor in the Department of Linguistics at the University of the 
Western Cape, where he teaches undergraduate and postgraduate courses in critical 
discourse analysis, the sociolinguistics of multilin- gual society and education, and 
technology-mediated business communication. His research interests include media and 
migration studies, linguistic landscapes and the semiotics of corporate identity 
branding and advertising. 
 
Arwa Mansour received her BA in English Language and Literature from Taiz University, 
Taiz, Yemen in 1995. She was awarded her MA in Translation from the same University 
in 2005. She obtained her PhD in Translation from the Department of English, Taiz 
University in 2010. She is currently the Vice Dean of the Center of Languages and 
Translation at Taiz University, Yemen. 
 
Appendix 
Internet video files 
Youtube (2011) Allah yumhilwalāyuhmilyaʿaliyaʿafāsh [Online Video]. 8 July. Available at: 
https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOXkemTVgEA (accessed 20 December 
2012). 
Youtube (2011) YaḤamādahwayakhalūdqulū li-bābatkummaṭrūd- Thawrat Al-Yaman 
[Online Video]. 16 March. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gaKiP0aKZ30 (Accessed 14 June 2011). 
Youtube (2011) Shiʿārāt min thawrat al-shaʿb Al-Yamanī al-silmiyah [Online Video]. 16 
March. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kX2aVqtOpjs (accessed 14 
June 2011). 
Youtube (2011) Al-thawra Al-Yamanyah: Jomʿat Al-raḥīl-Taʿiz [Online Video]. 27 
March. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HU1EIm2zmkg (accessed: 
14 June 2011). 
Youtube (2011) Ajmal hutafāt thawrat khamsah wa ʿishrīn yanayir amām Masbiro 
[Online Video]. 11 February. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsoE6oPWWwU (accessed 22 June 2011). 
Youtube (2011) Al-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-hukūmah [Online Video]. 24 January. Available 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8Xj8gAfjoI (accessed 22 June 2011). 
Youtube (2012) January 25, 2011 Qasr el Nil 1:46 PM [Online Video]. 24 January. Available 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=v1ItZFFY_rc 
(accessed 20 March 2013). 
 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
 30 
 
 
Other internet sources 
Al-akhbar (2011) Shiʿārāt al-thawrah Al-Yamaniyah: ʿibārāt mujazah lā takhlū min al-
duʿābah [Online]. Available at: www.al-akhbar.com/node/6050 - Saudi Arabia 
(accessed 19 October 2011). 
Aljazeera.net. (2011) Shiʿārāt al-thawra bi-dabābāt jaish Miṣr [Online]. Available at: 
http:// www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2011/2/5/ (accessed 19 
April 2011). 
Blogspot (2011) taʿrīf al-baltajah [Online]. Available at: 
http://3malamatan.blogspot.com/2008/06/ blog-post_08.html (accessed 14 
September 2011). 
Elaphblog (2011) Shafshufat Al-Qadhāfi [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.elaphblog.com/ posts.aspx?u=844&A=78370 (Accessed 20 October 
2011). 
Maktoob blog (2011) Al-shiʿārāt wa al-ḥanājir al-dhahabiya wa ʾ ahmiyataha fī tabrīr wa 
tajīj wa injāḥ al-thawra [Online]. Available at: 
http://halaabulail.maktoobblog.com/325/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%
D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-
D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9 (accessed 19 
October 2011). 
Muntadyāt ibn Al-Yaman (2011) Shiʿārāt al-thawrah Al-Yamanyah [Online]. Available 
at: http://www.ebnalyaman.com/ip/ipb/index.php?showtopic=20654 (Accessed 
20 October 2011). 
Muntadayat Jabal Habashi (2011) maʿan li-ajl alf shiʿār min shiʿārāt al-thawra al-
yamanyah [Online]. Available at: http://gaha.ba7r.org/t18174-topic (accessed 14 
September 2011). 
Shorouknews (2011) Qamūs Al-thawrat Al-ʿrabiyah: fī al-badʾkanāt (harimna) 
thumaintahat bi- al-fulūl) [Online]. Available at: 
www.shorouknews.com/print.aspx?id=474884 – Egypt (accessed 28 October 
2011). 
Sublat ʿumān (2011) 16 ḥaqīqah ghair maʿrūfah ʿan Al- Qathāfi wa Libya. [ONLINE] 
Available at: http://avb.s-oman.net/showthread.php?t=1372017 (accessed 12 
August 2015). 
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia (2011) Singing Revolution: Libyan protest slogans. 
[ONLINE] Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Libyan_protests_chants (accessed 10 
September 2011). 
World Bank (2013) Prospects: Middle East and North Africa. [ONLINE] Available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/0EJQA0G0C0 (accessed 12 August 2015). 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
